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Abstract
Some scholars have argued that globalization should pressure firms to adopt a common
set of the most efficient corporate governance practices, while others maintain that such
convergence will not occur because of a variety of forms of path-dependence.  With new data on
governance in 24 developing countries as well as data on laws protecting shareholders and
creditors in 49 developed and developing countries, we search for evidence that globalization is
correlated with similarity in corporate governance.  We find robust evidence of de jure similarity
in governance.  Interestingly, this is not driven by convergence to U.S. standards. Rather pairs of
economically interdependent countries – especially if the countries are both economically
developed - appear to adopt common corporate governance standards, even after accounting for
the effects of common legal origin.  In contrast to the de jure results, we find virtually no
evidence of de facto similarity in corporate governance in a battery of estimations at the country,
industry and firm levels.  This is consistent with either the proposition that complementarities
result in different national systems appropriately having different corporate governance systems,
or the proposition that globalization is not strong enough to overcome local vested interests.  We
conclude that globalization may have induced the adoption of some common corporate
governance standards but that there is little evidence that these standards have been implemented.
We are grateful to Michael Kremer, Dani Rodrik, Andrei Shleifer, John Sutton, and Louis Wells for helpful
conversations, and for suggestions from seminar participants at the HBS/Tsinghua conference on Global
Corporate Governance (Shanghai, July 2001), the Aspen Institute for Social Business/William Davidson
Institute conference (Aspen, September 2001), the Harvard/MIT Growth and Development Seminar
(October 2001), the University of Michigan Business School Corporate Strategy seminar, the Asian
Development Bank conference on Corporate Governance (November 2001), Hitotsubashi University
Economics Seminar (Tokyo, November 2001), Australian Graduate School of Management Seminar
(Sydney, November 2001),  Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Economics Seminar
(November 2001), Columbia Law School Law & Economics Seminar (December 2001), Instituto
Tecnológico Autónomo de México Business School seminar (February 2002), Pontificia Universidad
Católica de Chile Business School seminar (March 2002), and Harvard Business School Accounting and
Control seminar (April 2002).  The HBS Division of Research generously funded this research.  All errors
remain our own.2
1.  Introduction
Economists have studied convergence for a long time.  Most of this work has
focused on convergence in national income levels (Solow [1956], Baumol [1986], Romer
[1986], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992], Mankiw [1995]).  Recently, however, scholars
have also directed attention to the microeconomic foundations of such convergence.  In
particular, the question being asked is whether or not increased global integration of
markets is prompting convergence in the institutional foundations of economies (North
[1994]).  The idea that increasingly stringent global competition should increase the
likelihood of convergence to efficient institutional arrangements has some intuitive
appeal and has been investigated in a historical context (Ben-David [1993], Williamson
[1996]).
One set of institutional arrangements that has been scrutinized is related to the
governance of corporations.  The number of standards-setting bodies and multilateral
institutions that have been set up in recent times to foster good corporate governance
worldwide is testimony to the heightened interest in this particular issue.   These include
the International Corporate Governance Network, the International Accounting Standards
Committee, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, to name but a
few.  The OECD and the World Bank have issued guidelines for global principles of
good corporate governance and promote the dissemination of these guidelines (OECD
[2000] and World Bank [2001]).  This cottage industry of efforts received a fillip in the
wake of recent financial crises, when fingers were pointed at corporate governance
problems at least by some.
Theorists have weighed into the debate with gusto.  Some, espousing faith in the
efficiency-enhancing aspects of competition (especially in the capital markets), aver that
there will be complete convergence.  This position is exemplified by Hansmann and
Kraakmann [2001], in a paper entitled “The End of History for Corporate Law.”  Others
take the polar opposite view that the irresistible force of global competition will meet the
immovable object of path dependence.  Even if there could be agreement on what
constitutes an optimal corporate governance system – which traditionally has not proven
possible (Taylor [1998]) – there are too many complementarities in economic systems for
unstinting evolution toward the optimal corporate governance system (Aoki [1994],
Bebchuk and Roe [1999]).  Further, vested interests might well oppose such an evolution
(Olson [1971]).  Finally, advocates of adherence to various sets of minimal standards as
being the only feasible outcome are implicitly signaling belief in partial convergence
(Eichengreen [1999]).
These arguments run the virtual gamut of possibilities.  Yet there is no empirical
work on whether there is convergence in corporate governance systems of any sort, nor
any on the association of globalization with this phenomenon.  Presumably this is partly
because of the non-trivial nature of the question.  At some level, it is hard to dispute that
there is convergence.  For example, there is probably some convergence to acceptance of
the idea that resource providers should be protected, but much less to whether the
resource providers in question should be primarily shareholders or include other
stakeholders as well (Berglof and von Thadden [1994], Shleifer & Vishny [1997], Tirole3
[2001]).  Similarly, there is probably near-complete convergence to the idea that good
information is needed for good corporate governance, but much less convergence on
whether financial markets or banks are the best targets for such information.  Finally,
Hansmann and Kraakman [2001] argue that several features of the modern corporate
form are nearly universally adopted,
1 but it is hard to imagine that there is convergence
on the actions taken by managers even in the convergent legal structures that such firms
represent (Khanna [2001]).
Scholars have made an attempt to account for such subtleties by distinguishing
between convergence in “form” and convergence in “function.”  The latter arises since
different institutional arrangements in different countries have sufficient plasticity so as
to enable them to achieve similar economic ends (Gilson [2000]).  There is also
ambiguity as to the system toward which convergence might occur.  The systeme du jour
is the U.S. shareholder-centric one, though other systems have found favor in the not very
distant past (Berglof and Perotti [1995], Porter [1992]).
Theoretical issues are compounded by empirical ones.  First looking purely at
rules-on-the-books as indicators of corporate governance practices is unlikely to be
sufficient, even though it is one indicator (Pistor et al. [2000]).  It could be that formal
rules are circumvented in the all-too-common absence of good enforcement—a familiar
phenomenon in many developing countries.  Much less common, but quite possible, is
the idea that particular firms might well exceed the rules of their country of domicile in a
bid to gain economic advantage (Blass and Yafeh [2001], Khanna and Palepu [2001]).
Thus attention to intra-country variation is necessary.  Second, consistent cross-country
data on the multiple aspects of corporate governance—board structure, compensation
practices, disclosure and transparency, to name but a few—have traditionally been
difficult to come by.
We attempt to fill this empirical void partially by analyzing a variety of new
datasets.  A number of private sector organizations have recently started collecting firm-
level data on corporate governance practices.  This phenomenon is itself evidence of
convergence in that it demonstrates the belief on behalf of at least some organizations
that institutional investors are willing to pay for corporate governance information.  We
use year-2000 data obtained from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) on corporate
governance practices covering 24 developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and
Eastern Europe and data on laws protecting shareholders and creditors from La Porta et
al.[1998]..
2  Finally, we develop a host of measures of globalization of capital markets,
                                                
1 They emphasize full legal personality, limited liability, shared ownership by investors, board structure,
and transferable shares. A similar argument is made regarding the organization of nation states by Meyer et
al. [1997]. They conduct the interesting thought experiment: how would world society treat a hypothetical
country that newly emerged on the world stage. They aver that several aspects of societal organization in
such a nascent country would mirror arrangements commonly found elsewhere, i.e. that there would be
convergence.
2 These data and others that we use from Déminor, Proxinvest, and Fortune (described later) have not been
used in academic work, to the best of our knowledge.  Black’s [2001] data source differs from our own. He
finds a strong relationship between the market value of Russian firms and the corporate governance rating
they received from UBS Brunswick Warburg.4
but depart from the theoretical literature’s usual focus solely on capital markets to
consider competitive forces emanating from global markets for products and talent.
An important feature of our estimation technique – examining similarities in
governance among pairs of countries rather than treating the individual country
governance regime as the unit of analysis – is that it avoids normative assumptions
regarding the optimality of a particular governance regime, a stance vindicated by the
continued theoretical debate on this issue. We choose to let the data speak rather than
impose our priors on the data.
But our analysis has two important limitations worth highlighting.   First, lacking time-
series data , we are unable to test  convergence in a literal sense.  Rather our tests are
about correlations between globalization and similarity in corporate governance practices
at a point in time.  It is thus possible that convergence is occurring but that the de facto
practices today do not allow us to see this process Second, we do not say much about
causality.  We cannot distinguish between the possibility that the flows of global factors
and products force changes in corporate governance and the possibility that it is because
uniform corporate governance systems are adopted that globalization receives a boost.
We summarize our results as follows.  We find strong evidence that de jure
similarity in governance is correlated with several of our proxies for globalization.  These
proxies are not limited to those that measure capital market integration.  Further, the de
jure results are not driven by similarity with U.S. corporate governance.  Rather pairs of
economically interlinked countries display similarity to each others’ systems, especially
if both countries are ‘economically developed’ ones.  Finally, we find virtually no
evidence of de facto similarity.  An interpretation is that, even though countries might
mimic the tenets of each others’ systems, their implementation is subject to significant
lags.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the
literature on convergence in corporate governance.  Section 3 introduces the governance
ratings, covering selection effects and reliability issues.  It also motivates and describes
the independent variables we will use in our analysis.  Section 4 discusses the
methodology of the country level analysis and presents the results.  Section 5 confirms
the country level results using additional data sources and tests at the industry and firm
levels.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  The Literature on Convergence in Corporate Governance
Globalization entails a lifting of barriers to the mobility of capital, products, and
labor, leading to an intensification of competition for these factors across borders by
firms and countries.  Just as U.S. states competed for most of the twentieth century for
franchise tax revenues by offering the best terms for incorporation (Easterbrook and5
Fischel [1991], Romano [1993]),
3 nations could compete for firms and resources by
creating the most efficient corporate governance environment.
4
Proponents of the convergence hypothesis tend to highlight the role of global
capital flows in eliminating inefficient forms of governance.
5  They aver that
convergence is hastened by a realization that alternatives to U.S.-style shareholder-centric
governance have generally not succeeded.  Several multilateral bodies are spurring on
this process by urging the adoption of common standards (OECD [2000], World Bank
[2001]).
An aspect of the convergence debate recognized but not emphasized in the
literature is the distinction between de jure and de facto convergence. De jure
convergence is the adoption of similar corporate governance laws across countries.  De
facto convergence, on the other hand, refers to a convergence in actual practices.  Put
simply, nations may formally adopt corporate governance systems that look like those
elsewhere, but the acceptance of the enshrined principles may significantly lag their
codification. This may be for several reasons including a lack of understanding of what is
implied by the good corporate governance, absence of complementary institutions needed
to implement the principles, or simply poor enforcement (Pistor et al. [2000]).  One
contribution of our paper is to empirically demonstrate a distinction between these two
types of convergence across a large sample of countries.
There are three categories of explanations for why de facto convergence may lag
de jure convergence:  path dependence, multiple optima, and rent-seeking by interest
groups. According to the path dependence perspective, initial historical conditions matter
in determining the corporate governance structures that are prevalent today.  Central to
the idea of path dependence are complementarities, also called indivisibilities (Bebchuk
and Roe [1999], Bratton and McCahery [1999], Schmidt and Spindler [2000]).  Corporate
governance results from a system of complementary institutions, legal rules, and
practices where improving any one element independently may actually hurt efficiency.
Thus the main bank monitoring system that historically held sway in Japan depended for
its functioning on the existence of particular labor market practices (Aoki [1994]) and
patterns of equity cross-holdings among firms (Berglof and Perotti [1994]).  Sunk
adaptive costs and positive network externalities from the use of the same governance
practices by all firms in a country make switching more costly and prevent unilateral
governance changes by any one firm or institution.
                                                
3 There is some disagreement on whether competition between states has led to a race to the top or a race to
the bottom.  For example, Bebchuk et al [2002] showed empirically that state competition has worked
poorly in takeover regulation.
4Although most industrial nations do not permit reincorporation across countries as the U.S. allows
between states, firms are able to opt into particular regulatory regimes by listing on foreign stock
exchanges. In the case of Centros, the court ruled that a Danish company could incorporate in the U.K.
even though it had no intention of doing business in the U.K. and simply wanted to avoid the minimum
capital requirement for Danish incorporation. See European Court of Justice, March 9, 1999, C. 21/297 as
cited in Gilson [2000].
5 Khanna and Palepu [2001] have demonstrated the role of global talent markets and global product
markets in fostering some corporate governance convergence in the global software industry.6
Even in the absence of path dependence, complementarities induce multiple
optima, so that nations, even unburdened by historical constraints, may well choose
different bundles of practices that yield equivalent long-run corporate governance.
6
Believers in such a view of the world disagree with the idea that the U.S. model is the one
optimal governance model. Not very long ago the Japanese model held pride-of-place in
the minds of academics and practitioners (Porter [1992]). In particular, the U.S. model
was criticized at the time for three failures relative to the Japanese system – agency costs
arising from differences in managers' and shareholders' agendas, time horizon costs due
to the reliance of distant shareholders on short-term performance, and industrial
organization costs caused by the bureaucracy in vertical organizations that could have
been lessened in the presence of strong financial intermediation (Roe [1996]).  It is more
likely that there are tradeoffs between the systems and that each has costs and benefits
suited to different circumstances (Bhide [1993]). Consistent with the idea that there is no
universally optimal model, research on the impact of corporate governance on
performance has produced ambiguous results (See, for example, Demsetz and Lehn
[1985], Thomsen and Pederson [1996], and Coles, McWilliams, and Sen [2001]).
The force of path dependence leads some theorists, primarily legal theorists
interested in the foundations of financial markets, to draw a distinction between
convergence in form and convergence in function.  Formal convergence predicts a
convergence of legal rules and institutions while functional convergence predicts
adaptations within different existing institutions to perform the function of good
corporate governance.  Proponents of functional convergence would argue that different
institutions are equally capable of performing corporate governance functions such as
ensuring management accountability.
7  To the extent that it is possible, it is much less
costly to improve corporate performance by working within the current institutions than
creating new institutions.  Thus, the initial response to the competitive forces of
globalization should be functional rather than formal convergence as a result of this path
dependence (Gilson [2000]).
Even if there were a single universally optimal corporate governance system,
political resistance would pose a major obstacle to governance reform.  Because the
benefits of improved corporate governance are not distributed evenly, an increase in
social welfare that exceeds switching costs would not guarantee the adoption of better
practices.  This is an idea dating back at least to Olson [1971].  Interest groups such as
labor unions, banks, controlling shareholders, and lawyers may sabotage governance
reform (Bebchuk and Roe[1999], Coffee [1999]).  U.S.-style governance based on
                                                
6 See Kauffman (1993) for an early articulation of this from evolutionary biology and Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) for an adaptation to economics.
7 See Merton [1968],  “Chapter 1:  Manifest and Latent Functions,” for an early description of functional
analysis in sociology.  Crane [1995] is a more recent example of functional analysis as applied to financial
systems. Kaplan [1994] has provided some econometric evidence for functional convergence for a
particular aspect of corporate governance. Statistically, poorly performing CEOs appear equally likely to be
dismissed in the U.S., Germany and Japan, despite the very different formal systems in place.   In our
empirical analysis, we attempt a rudimentary test of functional convergence, within the constraints imposed
by our data.7
individualism may also conflict with values and anti-Western sentiment found in many
developing countries (Branson [2000]).
Despite these ongoing debates, there is exceedingly little empirical work, and
none that confronts the nexus between globalization and corporate governance
convergence that is the topic of this paper.
8
3.  Data
We use primarily two data sources on corporate governance practices across a
number of countries.  Laws on the books indicators collected by La Porta et al. [1998]
(LLSV) represent indicators of de jure governance.  A firm level survey completed by
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), when aggregated to the country level, provides
ratings on de facto governance. Even though most of our analysis ends up using the
LLSV data, we describe the CLSA data in detail. This is because it is new to academic
analysis, and because our inability to detect de facto convergence must be judged within
the constraints of the quality of the CLSA data. Our independent variables are proxies for
country-level exposure to global capital, product, and labor markets.
(I)  Dependent Variable: Corporate Governance Ratings
A.  Legal rules country-level data
We use novel data assembled by La Porta et al. [1998] on laws regarding
shareholder and creditor protection for 49 developed and developing countries.  Each of
eight aspects of shareholder protection and five aspects of creditor protection can be
coded as binary variables.
9  A value of one in each variable indicates that, say, the
country’s company law and commercial code or bankruptcy and reorganization law
incorporate that form of shareholder or creditor protection.  Since corporate governance
laws typically apply to all firms and industries, these variables are coded only at the
country level.
                                                
8 Guillén [2000] approaches the convergence hypothesis quantitatively.  He examines descriptive summary
statistics of aggregate national corporate governance indicators over time for a panel of countries.  With a
few exceptions, he finds that there have been no shifts in the proportion of stockholding by institutional
investors, debt-equity ratios, long-term incentives as a percentage of CEO remuneration, and hostile
takeover activity.
9 The eight shareholder protections are:  one share-one vote rule, proxy vote by mail, shares not blocked
before meeting, cumulative voting or proportional representation, mechanism for dealing with grievances
of oppressed minorities, preemptive rights to buy new stock issues by existing shareholders, low percentage
of share capital required to call extraordinary shareholder meeting, and mandatory dividend payment.  The
five creditor protection are:  restrictions for going into reorganization, no automatic stay on secured assets
in reorganization, secured creditors first in line, management does not stay in reorganization, and
mandatory minimum percentage of total share capital to avoid dissolution.  More detailed descriptions of
these protections are available in La Porta et al [1998].8
An advantage of these data is that they are collected objectively.  There is little
uncertainty regarding whether or not a particular law exists within a country.  La Porta et
al. [1988] also identify the origin of the legal system of each of their countries—English,
French, German, or Scandinavian—which we use as a measure of path dependence in
some of our estimations.
B.  Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA)
In April 2001, CLSA released a large study of corporate governance entitled,
“Saints & Sinners:  Who’s got religion,” which reviewed corporate governance at the
firm level in 25 emerging markets.  A firm’s corporate governance score is based on
responses to 57 yes/no questions about various aspects of governance.  CLSA’s research
analysts completed the questionnaire for 495 companies over a six-week period ending
March 2001.  Of these 57 questions, 70% are based on objective facts while 30% require
some interpretation by the analyst but still must be resolved as a yes or no answer.  In
cases where information was not available or evidence was lacking, analysts were
instructed to answer negatively.  Since a lack of corporate governance information should
be correlated with poor corporate governance, this practice should not lead to large
errors.  The CLSA questionnaire is divided into seven sections covering fiscal discipline,
accounting transparency/disclosure, board independence, board accountability,
responsibility, equitable treatment of shareholders, and social awareness.  The score for
each of the seven sections is simply the percentage of questions receiving a “yes” answer
in that section.
Note that the absolute value of the CLSA score for a company, therefore,
effectively measures proximity to the Anglo-Saxon system of governance (where there is
greater disclosure to outside parties, boards are comprised of independent outsiders),
rather than proximity to alternative relationship-based governance systems.
Further, since the firm-level data are about actual practices, rather than laws on
books, these data address de facto rather than de jure convergence.  By averaging the
scores across all firms within a country, we obtain de facto governance scores at the
country level.  A disadvantage of these data, relative to the de jure measures, is that the
CLSA data cover only developing countries while the laws-on-the-books indicators span
both developed and developing markets (in Europe, Asia and Latin America).
The most significant limitation of the CLSA data is that they are based on
subjective opinions.  Although research analysts rather than firms complete a detailed and
methodical questionnaire, for some of the questions, the analysts must rely on
information provided to them by the firms they are rating.  Since firms are asked to
provide information about their corporate governance, a substantial amount of
misreporting can be expected.  Misreporting can lead to noisy data and, even worse, if
firms with poor governance were more likely to misreport, then the ratings would not
measure the strength of governance at all.  The reliance on intermediaries such as
consulting firms and investment banks to interpret the data and generate the ratings may
also lead to biases.  These intermediaries are hardly disinterested parties, and, in some
cases, they are rating firms who may be their clients.9
We handle these reliability issues in two ways.  First, the thesis of CLSA’s
“Saints & Sinners:  Who’s got religion” is that corporate governance is correlated with
performance.  We have confirmed that CLSA’s governance ratings are significantly
correlated with firm P/E ratios.  Although we are not able to determine the direction of
causation, the correlation of corporate governance ratings with investors’ valuations of
the firm suggests that the ratings are capturing a real and relevant variable.  Second, as
described in Appendix 2, we generate our own ratings of egregious corporate governance
problems based on public sources only, avoiding some of the biases present in the other
ratings.  Based on business newspaper and magazine articles, we compile a list of firms
with reported instances of minority shareholder expropriation in the last two and a half
years, and other kinds of corporate governance problems.  Since compiling such data is
highly labor intensive, we focus the collection efforts only on firms in India, the
emerging market for which CLSA provided data on the largest number of firms.  We find
that the CLSA rataing is correlated with our index of minority shareholder exploitation
(though not as strongly with other corporate governance problems). It appears as though
the CLSA index does  capture major governance problems.
We also check CLSA’s sample selection procedure.  According to CLSA, the
sample of firms was selected based on two criteria:  size and investor interest.  “[B]eyond
the largest stocks in each market, our coverage would be biased towards companies that
we see as likely to be of interest to institutional investors and in making this decision, an
inherent sampling bias creeps in.”  If investor interest were correlated with corporate
governance, then the portion of the sample that was selected after the largest firms would
be biased towards well-governed firms and larger firms in the CLSA sample would
appear to have poorer corporate governance.  We test the determinants of selection
empirically by focusing on the selection of firms in India to ease the data gathering
process.  We use Bloomberg to generate a pool of firms from which the CLSA analysts
could have selected.   Appendix 3 describes a probit analysis of the determinants of
CLSA firm selection in this pool.  This analysis confirms that firms were selected based
on size and investor interest as CLSA claims.
Finally, for the bulk of our analysis, we aggregate the firm-level CLSA
governance ratings for all firms within a country, along each of the dimensions captured
by the data. We use the average ratings thus generated as country level indicators of the
particular facets of corporate governance (disclosure, transparency, board independence
etc.), the analogs to the country level de jure indicators in the LLSV data.  This process
averages out at least some of the idiosyncratic subjectivity in responses, though obviously
it does not remove country-level response biases.
(II) Independent Variables used in Estimations
Our country-level regressors try to capture the degree of capital market, product
market, and labor market integration between pairs of countries.  Factor price
equalization provides one theoretically defensible measure of the extent to which two10
markets are integrated.
10  While we do not have such measures literally, we use two
approximations.  The first pertains to a measure of the correlation in wage structure in
pairs of countries, the second to co-movement in equity prices. Of course, such
correlations might well be induced by common unobservables that have nothing to do
with true market integration.
Accordingly, we also examine “quantity” rather than price measures of
integration, using measures of both actual and potential flows between countries.
Competitive pressure in markets is transmitted through such flows.  For example, trade
flows or simply the threat of trade flows from abroad puts pressure on domestic firms to
be more efficient.  Similarly, the potential for capital flows should make countries and
firms more likely to reform governance in order to attract this capital.  Our measures of
actual flows include pairwise trade in products and pairwise foreign direct investment
(FDI).  Our measures of potential flows include geographic distance and the presence of a
common language.
A variable denoting the origin of the legal system is used to control for path
dependence.  If path dependence is indeed a force in the evolution of corporate
governance within a country, then the starting point should have an effect on the current
corporate governance laws and practices.  La Porta et al. [1998] found that origin of the
legal system is a significant determinant of current legal structure.  We treat the origin of
the legal system as a proxy for the starting point because it was determined exogenously
hundreds of years ago.
11  If the origin of the legal system is the only historical factor
relevant in determining current legal systems, then our test for similarity becomes a test
for convergence as well.
12 We motivate and describe the independent variables in greater
detail below.
A.  Wage Equalization
Under conditions of perfect labor mobility, workers of a particular skill level,
ability, or occupation should receive the same wage across countries after controlling for
differences in the cost of living.  Until recently, no systematic data on wages across
countries were available.  Freeman and Oostendorp [2000] have refined the ILO
international database of wages to create a dataset of monthly average pay for male
workers coded for 161 occupations across 154 countries over the years 1983 to 1998.
13
                                                
10 Similarly, a lack of equalization in the prices of capital and labor would indicate the presence of barriers
to the mobility of these factors.  However, the converse of this statement is not necessarily true.  We know
from International Trade theory that factor price equalization may occur when factors are not mobile but
products are.  (See, for example, Samuelson [1948] for an early version of this idea.)
11 Rajan and Zingales [2001] have argued against such an interpretation, however.
12 To see this, assume that the origin of the legal system entirely determines the starting point of the
corporate governance environment.  The LLSV and CLSA data represent the current corporate governance
environment.  In this way, we implicitly have data on corporate governance for each country at two points
in time.  This information allows us to estimate whether corporate governance between pairs of countries is
converging.
13 We are grateful to Remco Oostendorp for sharing these data with us.11
Since each country had data available for different years and different occupations and
the data are presented in local current currency units, we cannot simply compare wage
rates by occupation across countries.  Instead, we examine the structure of wages by
calculating the correlation of wages by occupation across country pairs.
14  If wages are
equalized, then we expect a correlation coefficient of 1; for example, if doctors earn more
than lawyers in one country, then they would earn more than lawyers in the other country
as well.   A drawback of this proxy is that wage structure may itself be an indicator of
corporate governance separate from the effects of cross-country labor mobility; certain
rankings of wages by occupation may result from a shareholder-centered system and
other rankings from a labor-centered system.
B.  Capital Market Co-movement
A rough measure of economic integration is the correlation of weekly stock
market index changes in percentage terms between two countries.  By definition,
movement in stock prices is caused by either a change in fundamentals or a change in
discount rate.  If an economic shock occurs in one country and the two countries are
economically interdependent, then the economic shock will also affect the other country.
Since fundamentals in both countries are affected, the stock prices of both countries
should move in the same direction.  Alternatively, if two countries have the same set of
investors, then the discount rate in both countries will move together and the stock
markets will be correlated.  In this case, co-movement becomes a proxy for integration
between two countries into a single capital market.
15  Stock price data come from the
Morgan Stanley stock indices, and, for a few countries where a Morgan Stanley index
was not available, from the national indices.  Most countries had data available for the
period January 1993 to August 2001, but in a few cases shorter time series  were used.
C. Trade
Flows of goods between two countries are indicative of openness between these
countries, at least in product markets.  The flow measures include both intra-industry and
inter-industry trade; although competitive pressures should be greater in cross-border
horizontal competition, pressures in a vertical relationship are also possible.  We develop
two related measures.  The first, Trade Partner, is appropriate if trade bears the same
importance in the political process regardless of size, perhaps because of its potential for
growth in the future.  The second, Trade Magnitude, assumes that the importance of trade
                                                
14 The actual procedure is to first take an average of wages by occupation for all available years from 1983-
1998 for each country.  The correlation coefficient is calculated on a pairwise basis for all occupations for
which both countries have reported data.  This method has obvious limitations since different pairs of
countries have different occupations in common.
15 Of course correlated changes in fundamentals may have other causes.  For example, if two economies
were affected by the same severe weather patterns, then their stock markets would be correlated even if
there were no economic linkages between them.  In the case of price fluctuations due to changes in discount
rates, the measure is also imperfect because it is possible that each stock market has separate investors with
correlated preferences.  Since co-movement represents only one of the many proxies we are testing, we do
not attempt to separate correlations due to fundamental and non-fundamental factors, using only a simple
correlation coefficient for the proxy.12
to political decision-makers is proportional to its current share in the economy.  Trade
Partner is the sum of the ratios:  IMPij, IMPji, EXPij, and EXPji, where IMPij is share of
total imports into country i originating from country j and EXPij is share of total exports
of country i that are going to country j.  Although this measure uses the same numerator
twice, it provides the most complete measure of whether the two countries are major
trading partners from either country’s perspective.  Trade Magnitude takes into account
the fact that international trade plays a larger role in some economies than others.  For
example, trade varies with the degree of openness.  Furthermore, for a given level of
openness, trade is more important for a small country than for a large country.  Trade
Magnitude is defined as the sum of pairwise total trade divided by the GDP of the first
country and the same total trade divided by the GDP of the second country.  The pairwise
trade data come from the World Trade Analyzer for 1996.
D. Foreign Direct Investment
Pairwise foreign direct investment can proxy for pressures for convergence of
corporate governance in several ways. Multinationals might operate more efficiently than
local firms because of their access to home country institutions—capital, talent or
technology, for example.  Competitive forces from the multinationals would then force
local firms to abandon inefficient corporate governance structures (Foley [2002]).
Mirroring our constructs in the case of the pairwise trade variables, we use two variables
for foreign direct investment called FDI Partner and FDI Magnitude.  FDI Partner
indicates to what degree inward investment in one country originates from another
country.  It is defined as the sum of FDIij and FDIji where FDIij represents the percentage
of total FDI in country i owned by firms in country j.  Since FDI plays a larger role in
some economies than others, FDI Magnitude weights the two percentages by the degree
to which FDI is present in the two economies.  The variable is defined as FDIij *
(Average FDI flows/GDP)i + FDIji *  (Average FDI flows/GDP)j.  Data for pairwise FDI
are taken from the United Nations World Investment Directory volumes 1-7.
E.  Geographic Distance and Common Language
Geographic distance and common language predict the likelihood of flows
between countries.  We expect countries that are located closer together to have lower
transport costs and smaller information acquisition costs, facilitating the flows of goods
and factors.  Similarly, flows between countries are aided by the presence of a common
language between the two countries.  These two variables have been extensively used in
the literature on gravity models in international trade.  Of course, geography and
language might well proxy for other underlying variables (Acemoglu et al. [2001],
Diamond [1999], Sachs and Warner [1995]). Data are from the atlas and from the CIA
Factbook.
4.  Similarity at the Country Level
We test the hypothesis that the corporate governance environment in a particular
country will be affected by that country’s integration into worldwide capital markets,13
product markets, and labor markets.  We make no assumptions regarding which country
has the optimal governance system and which other countries will try to emulate it, and
instead, test a general version of the hypothesis.  Economic linkages between any two
countries are hypothesized to create competitive pressure in each of the two countries to
adopt the optimal elements of its partner’s governance structure. Thus, pairs of countries
with greater economic linkages should have more similar governance structures.
16  We
perform the estimations first using the de jure governance data and then using the de
facto data.  We explore the de jure results in detail to understand which pairs of countries
are driving the results.
A.  Methodology
We use the 13 indicators of legal rules from the LLSV  data to construct a
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where Ci,l represents a 1 to 10 rating on the strength of protection in country i for
dimension l.
For each possible pair of countries, we regress these dependent variables on eight
measures of pairwise economic integration:  wage correlation, capital market co-
movement, FDI partner, FDI magnitude, trade partner, trade magnitude, geographic
distance, and common language.  We use the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) as
described in Appendix 4 to calculate standard errors for such dyadic data (Krackhardt,
1988).  Since the independent variables are correlated and, in many instances, meant to
proxy for the same type of integration, we test the effect of each of these separately.  We
distinguish between the effects of integration and historical path dependence by
controlling for common origin of legal system.  We also control for differences in level of
development on the grounds that governance is expected to differ between developed and
developing countries.  Less developed countries do not have the resources or expertise to
refine corporate governance laws and practices.  Since the level of economic integration
may differ between developed-developing and developed-developed/developing-
developing pairs, this control eliminates a potential omitted variable bias.
                                                
16 Our methodology is distinct from the Gravity Equation of international trade (See for example, Anderson
[1979], Leamer and Levinsohn [1995], Evenett and Keller [1998]) which predicts that the volume of trade
between two countries is proportional to the product of the two countries GDPs.  We do, however, use
some similar independent variables in our regressions such as geographic distance and common language.14
B.  De jure analysis
We find a strong link between economic integration and de jure governance
similarity.  Panel A of Table 1 displays the baseline regressions.  All of the globalization
proxies are of the expected sign and five of the variables (wage correlation, trade partner,
trade magnitude, geographic distance, and common language) are significant at the 10%,
5% or even 1% levels.  The predicted magnitude of the effect, expressed as the
percentage of a standard deviation change in the dependent variable resulting from a
standard deviation change in the independent variable, ranges from 8% to 29% for the
variables that were significant.  Common origin of the legal system is of the expected
sign and significant at the 1% level in all regressions.  Difference in development is of
the expected sign in all but one of the regressions but is not significant.
Which pairs of countries are driving the results?   We first test whether the results
are driven by integration with and similarity in governance to the United States.  We
create two new independent variables to replace each independent variable used in the
baseline regression.  The first independent variable equals the proxy for integration when
the pair contains the United States and zero otherwise.  The second independent variable
equals the proxy for integration when the pair does not contain the United States and
equals zero otherwise.  Contrary to expectations, the regression analysis of the effects of
these new independent variables (Panel B) reveals that non-U.S. pairs are driving the
results.  For U.S. pairs, only three of the eight variables are of the expected sign and only
one of these three is significant and merely at the 10% level.  For the case of the non-U.S.
pairs, all the variables are of the expected sign, and all except for capital market
correlation are significant, with five of the variables significant at the 1% level.  For most
variables, the magnitude of the predicted effect for non-U.S. pairs is larger than the
magnitude in the baseline regressions.
If U.S. pairs are not driving the results, then to what model of governance are
countries converging?  It appears that there is no single model. Rather, countries tend to
have governance similar to those of regional partners.  We demonstrate this pattern using
a methodology similar to that described above for the United States.  We generate two
independent variables, one for integration within regions and the other for integration
across regions, such that the former variable is zero when the pairs are not in the same
region and the latter is zero when the pairs are in the same region.  We are thus able to
estimate coefficients for the effects of integration within regions and then separate
coefficients for the effects of integration across regions.  As shown in Panel C, the results
for within-region integration are much stronger, both in terms of the significance of the
coefficients and the magnitudes of the predicted effects.  This regionalization of
governance is consistent with the previous result that convergence is not driven by
integration with the United States
Our indicator of geographic distance is significant between regions, but not within
regions.  This may be due to insufficient variation in this regressor within-region. Of
course, geography could be proxying for other variables (for example, culture or religion
(Stulz & Williamson [2001]), a possibility which would also be consistent with less intra-
regional than inter-regional variation.15
We also analyze the results according to level of development of the country pairs.
Common wisdom is that convergence will occur because governance practices spread
from developed countries with good governance to developed and developing countries
with poor governance.  Convergence between two developing countries is expected to be
less likely.  We divide the countries in our sample evenly into developed and developing
countries according to GDP per capita and then group the pairs into three categories:
developed-developed, developing-developing, and developed-developing.  Panel D
shows the coefficients for these regressions.  The effects of globalization are strongest in
terms of significance and magnitude of the coefficients in the developed-developed pairs
and weakest in the developing-developing, as expected.
Factor Analysis: Our proxies for globalization are often highly correlated.  Further, while
it may seem that some of these proxies measure globalization of a particular kind of
market— e.g. capital market—this is a tough case to make in practice.  For example,
foreign direct investment might be a proxy for any of capital, product or labor market
integration.  If correlation of capital markets is due to common economic factors
affecting the performance of firms in both countries, then this explanatory variable is a
proxy for economic integration in general.  Table 2 shows a factor analysis on the ten
explanatory variables, retaining three factors.  Factor 1 represents globalization with
heavy loadings on foreign direct investment, trade, and geographical distance.  Factor 2
represents differences in development with loadings on differences in Log GNP/capita
and capital market co-movement.  The presence of the latter variable in this factor
suggests that the correlation within emerging markets or within developed markets is
higher than the correlation between a developed country and a developing country (see
Morck, Yeung and Yu [2000] for a more detailed discussion of this pattern).  Factor 3
represents path dependency and contains common origin and common language.  While
common language was intended to be a proxy for the ease of mobility of labor between
two countries, it is easy to see how it would be highly correlated with common origin of
legal system and included in this factor.  The wage correlation variable does not receive
heavy weightings in any of the three retained factors.  The regression of legal rules
differences on these three factors finds all coefficients of the expected sign with common
origin significant at the 1% level and globalization to be significant at the 5% level.  We
also re-run this analysis focusing on dyads that do not involve the U.S.  The common
origin variable is as strong a predictor of convergence as before.  Additionally,
globalization is strengthened as a predictor, in magnitude and significance (1% level).
This buttresses our finding of de jure similarity in governance among pairs of
economically linked countries (especially when the U.S. is excluded).
C.  Comparison with de facto analysis
In contrast to the de jure results, we find almost no evidence of de facto similarity
between economically linked pairs of countries.  As shown in Table 3, of the 8 measures
that we test, the coefficients on three of them are of the wrong sign.  Of the remaining
five, only common language is significant and merely at the 10% level.  Common origin
of the legal system is of the expected sign in all regressions, but, surprisingly, is not
significant, indicating that this measure of path dependence is a poor predictor of16
governance enforcement.  Difference in level of development is also of the expected sign
in all regressions but not significant.
We are unable to implement the type of detailed analysis for the CLSA data that
we used for the LLSVdata because the CLSA data cover only developing countries.  We
attempted a factor analysis of the economic integration proxies for just the developing
countries, but the three factors were not easily interpretable.
The de facto and de jure results are not strictly comparable because they are
derived from different samples of countries.  Most importantly, the de jure results are
based on a sample that includes both developed and developing countries while the de
facto sample only contains developing countries. To address this problem, we perform an
apples-to-apples comparison by running the regressions on just the 19 countries for which
we have both de facto and de jure data.  These 19 countries are all developing countries,
where we expect to see the biggest difference between de facto and de jure results.  Here,
complementary institutions are weaker, political rent-seeking possibilities are greater, and
enforcement of the rules is inadequate. As hard as it is to change the legal regime
defining the rules of corporate governance, modifying actual practices to conform to
these legal reforms under the political and economic circumstances found in most
developing countries is an even greater challenge.  Our results in Table 4 confirm the
hypothesis that there is a large gap between de facto and de jure similiarity in developing
countries.  For this sample of countries, none of the coefficients in the de facto
regressions are significant and six of the eight coefficients are of the wrong sign.  In
contrast, in the de jure analysis all but one of the coefficients are of the right sign and five
of the coefficients are significant.  Thus, our results still hold in the apples-to-apples
sample of countries.
We summarize the results of the country level analysis thus.  We find evidence
that economic interdependence and similarity in de jure corporate governance practices
between pairs of countries are correlated, especially intra-regionally, and especially
among more developed countries.  Estimation using regressors derived from a factor
analysis confirms that ‘globalization’ and ‘similarity in corporate governance’ are
correlated even after controlling for ‘common origins.’ There is no such correlation
between economic interdependence and de facto corporate governance practices,
however. An interpretation of these results is that economically integrated countries have
rules-on-books regarding corporate governance that are more similar than they would be
if the countries were not as integrated; however, this similarity of rules-on-books does not
transfer into similarity in practice.  This interpretation is consistent with the findings in
transition economies of Pistor et al. [2000] and to those regarding Mexican firms exposed
to U.S. capital markets by Siegel [2001].
5.  Robustness Checks
A problem with aggregating corporate governance ratings at the country level is
that we ignore convergence along industry and firm lines.  Since most national laws
apply to all firms and industries, de jure convergence is inherently a country-level17
phenomenon.  On the other hand, de facto convergence can occur at the country, industry,
or firm levels.  We show using CLSA and other firm-level datasets that de facto
convergence is occurring at neither the industry level nor the firm level.  We also
investigate a number of political and economic factors at the country level that may
explain why convergence is happening only between certain pairs of countries.
A.  Convergence at the Industry Level
It has been argued that a different type of governance is appropriate for different
types of industries.  In skilled labor-intensive industries, it may be economically optimal
to give labor greater control in the governance of the firm in order to induce labor to
invest in acquiring firm-specific skills.  Alternatively, corporate governance convergence
may occur only in global industries, which would be more greatly affected by capital
market, product market, and labor market integration.
We test for the role of industry in determining governance using the data from
CLSA as well as three other sources of firm level governance ratings:  Déminor,
Proxinvest, and Fortune.  Data from Déminor and Proxinvest, two independent consulting
firms, provide governance ratings on the top 300 firms in Europe.  Fortune Magazine has
rated firms worldwide in its World’s Most Admired Companies Index.
If optimal governance structure differed by industry, then we would expect a
regression of firm level governance indicators on industry and country dummy variables
to find a significant role for industry.   Appendix  5 displays the Anova decomposition of
the four firm-level governance ratings (CLSA, Deminor, Proxinvest, and Fortune) into
country and sector effects.  Industry explains only 2% to 13% of the variance in corporate
governance scores while country explains 17% to 57% of the variance.  The contrast in
explanatory power is largest for the Déminor ratings where country explains 29 times
more variance than sector.  The relatively small effect of industry casts doubt on the
theory that different industries require different types of governance.
For another robustness check, we tested separately the argument that more global
industries have higher overall governance scores.  This is effectively a test for similarity
to U.S. corporate governance standards.  For each industry, we compiled several
measures of how global an industry is by aggregating data up from the firm level.  Two
of these measures were based on emerging market data (namely the propensity to list
abroad and to export), while two other measures were based on U.S. and Western
European multinational activity.  The advantage of the latter two variables is that they are
exogenous because they are not related to the dependent variable, the corporate
governance score of firms in emerging markets.  For all four measures, we were able to
reject the hypothesis that more global industries have governance closer to the U.S.
system of governance.
B.  Convergence at the Firm Level
Our sector categories in the industry-level analysis are quite broad resulting in
significant heterogeneity between firms in the same sector.  For this reason, we18
conducted firm-level analyses as well.   Mirroring some of our industry-level analyses,
we test whether firms that are more exposed to global markets have higher governance
scores, after controlling for country and industry effects.  We use three indicators of
exposure to global capital markets, one indicator of exposure to global product markets,
and one indicator of exposure to global labor markets.  These variables are:  institutional
investor holdings, U.S. common stock or ADR listings, the use of global intermediaries,
export intensity, and proportion of foreign board members.  Appendix  7 explains these
variables in more detail, including the motivation for their use and the source of the data.
As with some of our industry level analyses, the firm-level analyses effectively look for
correlations between exposure to global markets and de facto similarity to U.S. corporate
governance standards. We find little evidence of a relationship between firm-level
exposure to globalization and corporate governance.  Regression results from the CLSA
data are presented in Panel A of Appendix 8.  Although significant, the coefficient for
U.S. listing is small.
17 The institutional ownership coefficient is significant at the 10%
level in some of the regressions and the coefficient is also small.  The global intermediary
variables, representing whether the firm has had any connection with the big five
accounting firms or major Western investment banks, are not significant.  The export
intensity variable is not significant when we control for fixed country effects.  The
coefficient for foreign management and directors is significant at the 1% level but the
effect it represents is small.
We have ignored the issue of causation so far, inherently assuming that variables
such as institutional investor holdings are exogenous and that higher institutional
holdings would put more pressure on firms to change their governance practices.  Instead,
it is possible that a firm’s corporate governance affects the size of institutional investor
holdings.  Knowing that they will be unable to affect corporate governance of the firms
they invest in, institutional investors may decide to only invest in firms who already have
good corporate governance.  Since the coefficient on institutional investor holdings was
small and not highly significant, however, we are able to reject either direction of
causation as a significant force.  Similarly, firms with better corporate governance may
list in the U.S. rather than listing in the U.S. causing firms to improve corporate
governance, but the coefficient here was small as well.  As long as both directions of
causation lead to a coefficient of the same sign, our negative results still hold.
18
Our de jure regressions at the country level found the strongest results for
developed countries.  For this reason, we repeat the analysis, focusing on developed
countries in Europe using the Déminor data rather than the emerging markets in the
CLSA data. (The Déminor data are described in Appendix 6.) The results of regressions
on governance in Europe are similar.  As shown in Panel B of Appendix 8, U.S. listing is
                                                
17 Since a couple of the questions in the transparency section of the CLSA questionnaire related to
requirements that would be imposed by the SEC or by exchange listing rules, the improvement in
governance is probably accounted for by compliance with these regulations rather than indicative of a
voluntary effort by firms to improve governance in order to attract U.S. investors.
18 If, on the other hand, poorly governed firms rather than well-governed firms were more likely to list in
the U.S. because they needed to improve investor’s perceptions of their governance practices, then we
might obtain a negative result when in fact there were opposing forces along both directions of causations.19
the only variable that is significant in within country regressions.  The effect of a U.S.
listing is a 0.3 point increase in corporate governance on a scale of 1 to 4.7, which we
conjecture is small enough to be attributable to listing requirements.  The U.S. listing
variable emerges as statistically significant in both the CLSA and the Déminor
regressions.  The small size of the effect, however, is consistent with Siegel’s [2001]
finding that ADR listings did not constrain Mexican companies with ADRs from
expropriating minority shareholders.
We also test for convergence along a more direct channel, that of pressure by
controlling shareholders.  We expect to find the greatest differences from country peers
for those firms where the top shareholder is a U.S. firm or a U.K firm.  As shown in
Appendix 9, we identified 13 firms in the CLSA sample where the top shareholder was in
this category.  Of these 13 firms, 10 had a corporate governance rating greater than their
country peers while 3 had a lower rating.  However, a fixed country effects regression of
weighted corporate governance ratings on a dummy variable representing whether or not
the top shareholder was a U.S. or U.K. firm yielded a positive but insignificant
coefficient.  It is surprising that controlling shareholders did not have more of an effect
on governance.
 C.  Additional Explanatory Variables in the Country Level Analyses
One explanation for why convergence may not happen despite competitive
pressures is that vested interests capture political processes and prevent the adoption of
needed reforms.  We test this hypothesis first using data on the level of democracy in
each country, hypothesizing that reform is more likely in democratic countries.  We use
three proxies for democracy (democracy index, political constraints index, and gini
coefficient) and test whether integration has a larger effect when the pair of countries are
more democratic.  The empirical results here are inconclusive.  Since there is substantial
disagreement in the academic literature regarding whether reform is more feasible under
democracy or autocracy, the lack of a clear relationship in this case is not surprising.  We
repeat the analysis using a clearer proxy for the power of vested interests—union
membership.  We expect unions to oppose corporate governance reform intended to
strengthen shareholder rights or creditor rights; for this reason, countries with a larger
percentage of workers in unions should be less likely to reform.  Surprisingly, the
empirical analysis finds the opposite relationship.  Similarity in governance due to
integration was significantly greater in pairs of countries with high union membership.  In
a separate analysis, we test whether reform is more likely in countries that have recently
experienced a currency crisis or received international aid.  We find no significant
evidence in support of either relationship.
6.  Conclusion
Theorists have debated the extent of convergence in corporate governance for
some time now.  Opinions span the spectrum from believers that global competition will
force (and has already forced) such convergence (Hansmann and Kraakman[2001]),
through more measured views that functional convergence rather than literal convergence20
will occur (Gilson [2000]), to the idea that path dependent considerations preclude the
possibility of meaningful convergence (Bebchuk and Roe [1999]).  Others have drawn
attention to the importance of distinguishing rules-on-the-book convergence from
effective convergence, which we refer to in this paper as de jure and de facto
convergence respectively (Pistor et al. [2000]).
Yet these debates about the role of global competition in fostering convergence
are generally not informed by systematic empirical inquiry.  We conjecture that this is
partly because of the difficulty of defining and operationalizing the notion of
convergence. We take a small step in the direction of remedying this lack of literature.  In
particular, we amass several new datasets on de facto corporate governance practices of
firms in several developed and developing markets. We contrast the de facto results from
these datasets with a new use of the now ubiquitous La Porta et al. data on shareholder
and creditor rights, which we interpret as indicators of de jure convergence, as Pistor et
al. have shown convincingly in their analysis of transition economies. We try to be
careful about what we mean by “globalization.”  In other words, we distinguish—with
useful empirical implications, as it turns out—globalization as exposure to the U.S.
system currently in ascendance around the world, from globalization as economic
interdependence between any pair of countries.
Our results, based on cross-sectional data, test the hypothesis that similarity in
corporate governance between two countries is correlated with economic integration
between those countries.  This test for similarity is also a test for corporate governance
convergence under certain conditions.  First, complete convergence to one optimal
standard must have not already occurred, since if such convergence had occurred, we
would actually find no correlation between similarity in governance and integration.  The
heterogeneity in governance across countries demonstrates that this condition is met.
Second, common origin of the legal system must be a sufficient control for the path
dependence.  If common origin does indeed sufficiently control for the point at which
governance laws and practices started hundreds of years ago, then any common deviation
from this starting point by economically-interlinked countries is indicative of a
convergence process.
Our conclusions challenge conventional wisdom. We find robust evidence of de
jure convergence at the country level.  Interestingly, this is not driven by convergence to
U.S. standards.  Rather pairs of economically interdependent countries appear to adopt
common corporate governance standards, especially if the pair of countries in question
are in the same geographic region and are relatively developed economies.  In contrast to
these de jure results, we find virtually no evidence of de facto convergence in corporate
governance in a battery of estimations at the country, industry and firm levels.  This is
consistent with either the proposition that complementarities result in different national
systems appropriately having different corporate governance systems, or the proposition
that globalization is not strong enough to overcome local vested interests. We conclude
that globalization may have induced the adoption of some common corporate governance
standards but that there is little evidence that these standards have been implemented.21
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Table 1:  Dyadic Analysis of La Porta (de jure) country data
Each row represents a separate univariate dyadic regression utilizing one of eight proxies for pairwise economic integration as the explanatory variable.  All
regressions control for pairwise differences in Log GDP/capita and for common origin of legal systems.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the
“distance” in corporate governance between two countries, which is calculated as the sum of differences along 13 dimensions of creditor and shareholder rights
with data from La Porta et al [1998]. The sample is all possible pairs of countries for which we have governance and pairwise economic integration data.  The
expected sign in the second column is based on the hypothesis that more economic integration leads to a smaller “distance” in governance.
Parentheses contain percentile distributions of the actual coefficient within coefficients under the null hypothesis  generated from a QAP simulation with 500
draws.  A percentile less than 5% or greater than 95%, for example, indicates a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level.  Magnitude, in the column, is
calculated as the coefficient on the independent variable multiplied by that variable’s standard deviation and then divided by the standard deviation of the
dependent variable.  * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

































(100.0%) 40 780 -18%
Correlation coefficient between average
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Correlation coefficient between weekly %
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(100.0%) 47 1081 -6%
Share of total FDI in country A originating
in B and vice versa







(100.0%) 45 990 -4%
FDI Partner multiplied by FDI/GDP for
each country







(100.0%) 49 1176 -8%
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country A originating in B and vice versa
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(100.0%) 49 1176 29%
Distance in kilometers between the capitals
of two countries







(100.0%) 49 1176 -14%
Equals one if the two countries have a
language in common28
Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in Panel A has been replaced by two independent
variables, which separate the effects between U.S. pairs and non-U.S. pairs.  The first independent variable equals the underlying proxy for integration when the
pair contains the United States and zero otherwise.  The second independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the pair does not contain the United
States and equals zero otherwise.
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(100.0%) 49 1176 -13%





















(100.0%) 49 1176 29%









(100.0%) 49 1176 -16%29
Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in Panel A has been replaced by two independent
variables, which separate the effects of integration between regions and within regions.  The first independent variable equals the underlying proxy for
integration when the observation is for two countries located in the same region and equals zero otherwise.  The second independent variable equals the proxy for
integration when the observation is for two countries located in different regions and equals zero otherwise.  Regions are North America, South America, Europe,
Asia, Africa, Middle East, Australia.



























































(100.0%) 45 990 13% -11%
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(100.0%) 49 1176 -12% -21%30
Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in Panel A has been replaced by three independent
variables, which separate the effects of integration into three categories:  developed-developed, developing-developing, and developed-developing.  The first
independent variable equals the underlying proxy for integration when the observation is for two developed countries.  The second independent variable equals
the proxy for integration when the observation is for two developing countries and equals zero otherwise.  The third independent variable equals the proxy for
integration when the observation is for a developed and a developing country and equals zero otherwise.
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(100.0%) 39 741 -44% -28% -23%31
Table 2:  Factor Analysis on Pairwise Explanatory Variables
A factor analysis of the eight pairwise proxies for economic integration identifies three factors which are easily
interpretable as globalization, difference in development, and common origin.  These factors are then used in a
multivariate dyadic regression.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the “distance” in corporate governance
between two countries, which is calculated as the sum of differences along 13 dimensions of creditor and
shareholder rights with data from La Porta et al [1998]. The sample is all possible pairs of countries for which we
have governance and all eight pairwise integration measures.
Parentheses contain percentile distributions of the actual coefficient within coefficients under the null hypothesis
generated from a QAP simulation with 500 draws.  A percentile less than 5% or greater than 95%, for example,
indicates a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level.  Magnitude, in the column, is calculated as the coefficient
on the independent variable multiplied by that variable’s standard deviation and then divided by the standard
deviation of the dependent variable.  *significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1%
level









Eigenvalue 2.96 0.87 0.51
Rotated factor loadings:
Common Legal System 0.09124 0.01408 0.49227 0.74915
Difference in Log GNP/capita -0.04588 0.6387 0.0313 0.58897
Wage Correlation 0.17705 -0.06871 -0.13838 0.94478
Capital Market Correlation 0.2691 -0.67576 -0.03513 0.46969
FDI Partner 0.79849 0.00914 -0.02247 0.36182
FDI Magnitude 0.78307 0.00016 -0.01538 0.38656
Trade Partner 0.84138 -0.17286 0.09574 0.25303
Trade Magnitude 0.79839 -0.16707 0.09359 0.3259
Geographic Distance -0.26254 0.16065 -0.1402 0.88561
Common Language 0.14661 0.10342 0.52292 0.69436
Regression on Factors



























Number of Pairs 35 34
R-Squared 595 56132
Table 3:  Dyadic Analysis of CLSA (de facto) data
Each row represents a separate univariate dyadic regression utilizing one of eight proxies for pairwise economic
integration as the explanatory variable.  All regressions control for pairwise differences in Log GDP/capita and for
common origin of legal systems.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the “distance” in corporate governance
between two countries, which is calculated as the sum of differences along 7 dimensions of corporate governance
practices using CLSA firm-level data aggregated to the country level.  The sample is all possible pairs of countries
for which we have governance and pairwise economic integration data.  The expected sign in the second column is
based on the hypothesis that more economic integration leads to a smaller “distance” in governance.
Parentheses contain percentile distributions of the actual coefficient within coefficients under the null hypothesis
generated from a QAP simulation with 500 draws.  A percentile less than 5% or greater than 95%, for example,
indicates a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level.  Magnitude, in the column, is calculated as the coefficient
on the independent variable multiplied by that variable’s standard deviation and then divided by the standard





























































































Table 4:  Dyadic Analysis (Apples vs. Apples countries)
These panels repeat the regressions of Table 1 and Table 3, but restrict the sample in both panels to a common set of
countries.























































































































































































Appendix 1:  Model of Corporate Governance Adoption
We propose a model to examine the initial adoption and possible subsequent dissemination of corporate
governance practices in a given country.  The model assumes that by adopting good corporate governance practices
some firms are able to distinguish themselves from other firms in their country as being committed to running the
firm for the shareholders.  It is motivated in part by the implementation of laws in some countries requiring firms to
disclose information about corporate governance practices such as adherence to voluntary codes.
19  The fact that
these countries permit any governance practices as long as they are disclosed demonstrates the importance placed on
providing sufficient information to investors to help them distinguish between well governed and poorly governed
firms.  The model uses ideas from Spence [1973] on job market signaling but deviates from the Spence model in that
corporate governance practices can actually enhance performance as opposed to being merely a signal correlated
with performance.  It is also related to Blass and Yafeh [2001], which argued that the high-quality Israeli firms are
willing bear the additional cost of listing in the United States to distinguish themselves from lower-quality firms that
go public in Tel Aviv.
20
The initial model considers the conditions under which two types of firms will adopt good corporate
governance practices.  An extension of the model examines what role the government can play in promoting
shareholder centered governance.
Assume there exist two types of firms in a country, type G(Good) and type B(Bad), representing a
proportion q and 1-q of the population.  The difference between a G firm and a B firm is that the G firm is run with
only the interests of shareholders in mind while a B firm pursues multiple objectives.  An investment in a G firm
pays a rate of return RG while a similar investment in a B firm pays RB such that by assumption RG > RB.  Foreign
investors do not observe firm types. Investment in each firm I is a function of expected return r such that I=I(r)
where I’(r) ≥  0 for all r ∈  [RB, RG], I(RB)=0, and I(RG)>0.  In the absence of any signals, investors expect a return of
q* RG + (1-q)RB for an investment in any firm in that country and each firm will receive an investment amount of
I(q*RG + (1-q)RB).
An observable indicator of firm intent to foreign investors is the adoption of shareholder centered
governance practices.  By reforming governance practices, either type of firm can commit itself to running the firm
in the shareholders’ interest and delivering a return RG to the foreign investors.  Reform entails a cost c to both types
of firms; in order to reform corporate governance, the firm must expend resources to determine what are the best
appropriate practices, to convince the relevant stakeholders to approve these practices, and to implement the
changes.  B firms must pay an additional cost z because adoption of shareholder-centered objectives entails a loss to
other stakeholders.  Both types of firms derive a benefit b from each unit of foreign investment.
21  An interpretation
of b is the return the firm will generate for all stakeholders using this foreign investment to take advantage of an
opportunity for which the firm previously did not have enough capital.
                                                
19 Belgian companies are required “to disclose whether they are in compliance with the recommendations of the
1998 Report of the Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance (Cardon Report).”  The Tokyo Stock Exchange
“requires all listed companies to include a statement describing their corporate governance practices when they
submit their preliminary annual results.”  Mexican firms are required to report their adherence to a voluntary code of
corporate governance.  See OECD [2000[.
20 Costs of U.S. listing relative to Tel Aviv listing included the common phenomenon in the U.S. of first-day
underpricing, the loss of control because US IPOs lead to more dispersed ownership, and loss of capital gains tax
exemptions for Israeli listed firms.
21 Technically, the controlling stakeholders of B firms prior to corporate governance reform are not the same as
those following reform and the benefit of investment might accrue to the latter stakeholders only.  Incorporating this
element into the model would complicate the model but not effective the general results.35
We imagine a two stage game that occurs following a globalization shock in which U.S. investors become
interested in the firms of this country.
22  First, each firm decides whether to reform corporate governance practices.
Second, investors observe any corporate governance reforms and make investments in the firms.  Proposition 1
gives the results of such a game.
Proposition 1:  Three equilibria are possible in such a game:  two pooling equilibria where either all firms adopt
better corporate governance or no firms adopt better governance, and a separating equilibrium where only some
firms adopt better governance.
The conditions under which these equilibria will occur are:
Outcome Criteria
(1)Pooling Equilibrium with all
firms adopting
b*(I(RG)-I(q* RG + (1-q)RB)) > c And b*I(RG)>c+z
(2)Separating Equilibrium b*(I(RG)-I(q* RG + (1-q)RB)) > c And b*I(RG)<c+z
(3)Pooling Equilibrium with no
firms adopting
b*(I(RG)-I(q* RG + (1-q)RB)) < c
According to these results, there will be some countries with homogenous governance structures across
firms and some countries with heterogeneous governance. Intuitively, a separating equilibrium occurs when some
firms are run to a large extent for non-shareholder purposes corresponding to the case where z is large because in
this case the benefits of the current management style for the controlling stakeholders exceeds the benefit from
foreign investment that could be obtained in exchange for a loss of control.
The model clarifies two motivations for corporate governance reform.  G firms reform corporate
governance to distinguish themselves from B firms, while B firms adopt reforms in order to commit themselves to
delivering returns to the investors.  The interesting feature of this model is the interdependence of adoption decisions
between firms.  In the case of c + z> b*(I(RG)-I(q* RG + (1-q)RB)) > c, B firms prefer a state where no one adopts
and are hurt by the reform of G firms.  If in addition b*I(RG)<c+z, then B firms are adopting only as a response to
their expectation that G firms will adopt.
The model has demonstrated how globalization can lead to the adoption of shareholder-centered corporate
governance practices by some or all firms.  Governance reform can also be imposed on all firms by the government
through legal rules and institutions that provide protection to shareholders. The advantage of action by the
government is that firms do not have to incur the cost c of implementing their own reforms. When is the government
likely to act?
Proposition 2:  The government is less likely to encounter opposition from B firms to reform when at least some
firms were going to adopt independently.
We verify this proposition by considering each of the 3 outcomes in turn.  What do firms stand to lose and gain
relative to a case where the government took no action?
Expected outcome if no
government action
Loss to B firms
from gov’t action
Gain to B firms
from gov’t action
Gain to G firms
from gov’t action
(1)Pooling Equilibrium with all
firms adopting
0c c
(2)Separating Equilibrium Z b*I(RG)c
                                                
22 Alternatively, the globalization shock might be limited to only a certain sector in that country.  For example, if
foreign investors suddenly became interested in technology firms in India, then the relevant population is just Indian
technology firms rather than all Indian firms, and only Indian technology firms would even consider adopting.36
(3)Pooling Equilibrium with no
firms adopting




We note that G firms do not oppose government action in any of the three outcomes because they are
already operate in the interests of shareholders.  Opposition to government action can only come from B firms.  In
outcome 1, the net benefit to B firms is strictly positive.  In outcome 2 and 3, the net benefit to B firms can be
positive or negative, but a positive net benefit and no opposition in outcome 3 implies a positive net benefit and no
opposition in outcome 2.  In outcome 2, B firms are expecting G firms to adopt better governance and, for this
reason, they have more to gain from government action.  If the key determinant of government action is the presence
of opposition, then government action is more likely when there is already some talk among firms about individual
governance practices.  If, instead, the government considers the magnitude of the benefits to the G firms and weighs
these benefits against the costs and benefits to the B firms, then the greater impetus for government action can occur
in outcome 2 or 3, depending on the particular parameter values.37
 Appendix 2:  Constructing the Scandals Index
We create an index of egregious corporate governance violations by combing the public media over the last
two and a half years for instances of such violations.  Because of the time required to manually scan newspaper
articles for scandals for each company, we focus our search on the 80 Indian companies in the CLSA database.  We
choose India because it is the country for which CLSA provides data on the most number of firms and there is a
large range of corporate governance practices in India, with CLSA ratings ranging from 37 to 93 on a 100 point
scale.   We record for each firm whether it had any of the following three types of scandals:  shareholder
expropriation, tax evasion, and price fixing.
We search the India Business Insight database within Lexis-Nexis for articles about each of these 80 firms
from the last two and a half years.
23  We manually scan article headlines for relevant stories and then read any such
articles to determine if there indeed was a scandal and what type of scandal it was.  For each firm we record the total
number of articles found about that firm which will serve as a control for the media attention devoted to that firm.
Three types of scandals are recorded:
1.  Shareholder Expropriation – Equals one if any shareholders have accused management of taking actions
such as selling off assets, siphoning off funds, or insider trading, where management benefited at the
expense of shareholders or majority shareholders benefited at the expense of minority shareholders.  (8
cases found)
2.  Tax Evasion – Equals one if the company has been raided or investigated for tax evasion or if a warrant has
been issued in response to a failure to pay taxes.  Does not include instances where certain deductions were
ruled inappropriate by the courts or by the income tax department.  (3 cases found)
3.  Price fixing – Equals one if the company has been accused by the government of operating in a cartel to
raise the prices of its products.  (4 cases found)
24
Our search also found other types of scandals but many of these occurred only once and were not as clear cut cases
of poor corporate governance.
25
Probit regressions found that the shareholder expropriation index was correlated with the CLSA data but
the tax evasion and price fixing indices were not.
                                                
23 According to Lexis-Nexis, “India Business Insight compiles and consolidates vital information on Indian business
and industry from business magazines and newspapers.  Information is provided in English language in the form of
crisp abstracts of articles from over 40 newspapers and magazines.  The database has over 70,000 records cover[ing]
30,000 companies, 300 industry segments and over 8,000 products.”   Coverage begins on January 11, 1999.  The
search was performed in August and September of 2001.
24 There was actually only one instance of price fixing involving four of the firms in our sample so that the cases are
not independent.
25We found four cases of environmental damage related to illegal dumping or failure to get proper clearances.  There
were a couple of instances of contractual disputes but it is not clear whether these are related to corporate
governance.  Three pharmaceutical firms were accused of intellectual property rights violations but India has not
adopted global intellectual property norms.38
Appendix 3:  Selection Issues in the CLSA data
The CLSA sample contains 80 Indian firms with scores ranging from 37 to 93 on a 100 point scale.  To
examine the selection process which resulted in these firms showing up in the CLSA data, we select all Indian firms
listed in Bloomberg with greater than $20 million in market capitalization, producing a list of 301 firms.  This pool
contains 73 of the CLSA firms, with 5 left out because no market capitalization information was available and 2 left
out because market capitalization was less than $20 million according to Bloomberg.  The table below shows a
probit regression testing the determinants of firm selection by CLSA.  The coefficient of log assets, a proxy for firm
size, is positive and significant at the 1% level indicating that large firms are more likely to be included.  U.S. listing
and percent of outstanding shares held by institutional investors are also significant at the 1% level.  Export/Sales is
positive indicating that firms that sell to foreign markets are more likely to be selected but the coefficient is not
significant.  Having a big 5 auditor increases the probability of selection and is significant at the 10% level.  Not
shown in the table is the fact that all Indian firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange were selected for
inclusion.  These results confirm the claim that CLSA selected large firms as well as firms that should be of interest
to U.S. institutional investors.




US Listed (Common Stock or ADR) 0.624***
(0.207)










Number of Observations 208
Log-Likelihood 103.9
Pseudo R2 0.2140
* 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance39
Appendix 4:  QAP Estimation
An OLS regression with dyadic variables produces unbiased coefficient, but since the pairwise
observations are not independent, OLS standard errors could be too small leading to possible misinterpretations of
spurious correlations.  We use the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), a technique developed for the analysis of
dyads in networks (see for example Krackhardt[1988]), to test statistical significance of the regression coefficients.
Our pairwise dependent and independent variables each form the lower triangle of a matrix where the rows and
columns are countries.  The QAP method involves scrambling the data such that the each dependent variable is
randomly reassigned to a different observation.  The OLS regression is run on the scrambled data and new
coefficient estimates are generated.  Repeating this process 500 times generates a sampling distribution of the
coefficient estimate under the null hypothesis.  In order to preserve the interdependencies in the rows and columns in
generating the null distribution, the scrambling is accomplished by randomly permuting rows and columns of the
matrix;  the rows of the dependent variable are rearranged in a new, randomly assigned order, and the columns are
rearranged in the same order.  To assess statistical significance, we compare the original coefficient estimate with
the null distribution.  If this coefficient falls in the upper or lower 2.5% of the distribution, then this coefficient is
significant at the 5% level.  Recent studies using QAP have carried out permutation and estimation steps from
several hundred to over 1,000 times.  Varying the number of repetitions from 500 has very little effect on our results.40
Appendix 5:  Supplementary Data
A.  Déminor firm-level ratings
Déminor is an independent consulting firm located in Brussels and Paris that provides research and proxy
voting services to institutional investors.  The sample for their 2000 corporate governance ratings service are the top
300 firms as determined by their inclusion on major European stock indices.  Information is drawn from publicly
available sources such as annual reports and newspaper articles, as well as public information requested from the
firms being rated.  Déminor uses 300 corporate governance indicators to rate firms on their governance practices on
four areas:  rights and duties of shareholders, absence of takeover defenses, disclosure, and board structure.  The
first area is rated on a scale of 1 to 4 while the second and third are on a scale of 1 to 5.  Déminor does not disclose
the board structure rating to the public.  The actual grid of indicators used to assess governance is also not disclosed.
Déminor relies less than CLSA on the expertise of an analyst familiar with the firm being rated and more
on public and firm sources.  Since more public information is available on firms in Europe than firms in developing
countries, having an expert on the firm perform the ratings of the firms in the Déminor sample is probably less
important.  There is no overlap between the set of countries in the Déminor data and those in the CLSA data. As
with the CLSA data, the Déminor data can be used to probe the possibility of de facto convergence.
B.  ProxInvest firm-level ratings
ProxInvest is a French proxy voting service which calculated corporate governance ratings for 250 top
European companies.  They publicly disclose ratings for the top rated 100 of these companies but do not provide any
information on sample selection or the composition of their overall index.  Since the Déminor data are available for
more firms and more information is available regarding its composition, we base our European firm-level analysis
on the Déminor data rather than the ProxInvest data.  We use the ProxInvest data as an alternate source of data to
confirm some of our results.
C.  Fortune firm-level ratings
Fortune magazine has published an annual list of global most admired companies since 1997. To construct
this list, firms from the Global 500 list of largest companies are separated by sector (industry). Sectors dominated by
firms from one country are removed.  Every firm is sent a survey asking it to rate all of the other firms in its sector
on a scale of 1 to 10 on eight characteristics:  quality of management, quality of products and services,
innovativeness, long-term investment value, financial soundness, ability to attract/develop/retail talent, community
responsibility, and use of corporate assets.  A firm’s “admired” score is simply the average of the scores over these
eight characteristics (though Fortune reports only the average score and not its constituents).  The most significant
value of this data is that the index considers stakeholders other than shareholders.
26 The cross-country coverage is
also a plus of this dataset, as is the fact that the countries it covers tend not to overlap with those in the CLSA data.
Finally it is the only dataset available in time-series, though we do not yet exploit the time-series nature of this data.
D.  Relationship between firm-level ratings
To what extent are good corporate governance practices easy to define and measure?  Since there is overlap
between the companies covered in the Déminor, ProxInvest, and Fortune ratings, we test the hypothesis that the
rating agencies agree on which companies are well-governed and poorly governed.  There are 90 firms for which we
have both a Déminor and ProxInvest rating, and for these observations, the correlation coefficient between the two
indices is 0.53.  We also test for correlation within countries by regressing the Déminor index on country dummy
variables as well as the ProxInvest rating, obtaining a positive and highly significant coefficient (t-statistic of 4.50).
                                                
26 Similar ratings taken from Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies list have been used in evaluating the
relationship between corporate governance and performance (Preston and O’Bannon[[1997], Waddock and Graves
[1997].)  In U.S. studies, only components relevant to shareholders are used typically, but Fortune does not disclose
the components of the Global Admired index to the public.41
Since the ProxInvest rating is publicly disclosed for only the top 100 firms, these tests have shown only an
agreement between the two rating indices on well-governed firms.  To verify that the indices correspond on the
entire Déminor sample of European firms, we check whether the firms which were in the top 100 according to
Proxinvest had higher Déminor scores than those firms which were not in the top 100.
27  The mean Déminor score
for firms in the top 100 was higher by 0.51—about a half of the standard deviation of the Déminor scores--than the
mean for firms not in the top 100 and this difference was highly significant with a t-statistic of 3.88.
The Fortune rankings are not closely correlated with either the Déminor or ProxInvest ratings, with
correlation coefficients of .05 and .15 in 77 and 40 overlapping observations, respectively.  The Fortune coefficient
takes on an insignificant and surprisingly negative coefficient in within-country regressions.  The lack of
correspondence probably results from the different criteria used by Fortune in its rating service which focused on
overall management rather than adherence to a shareholder-centered model.
                                                
27 We do not actually know which other firms were ranked by ProxInvest.  However, both Déminor and ProxInvest
claim to have ranked the top 250 companies in Europe.  Based on what we can tell from the 100 top firms ranked,
ProxInvest did not rate firms in Belgium, Switzerland or the U.K.  The test we run involves comparing, for all firms
which Déminor ranked except for firms from the above three countries,  the mean Déminor score of firms for which
no ProxInvest score was available with the mean Déminor score for firms for which a Proxinvest score was
available.42
Appendix 6:  Anova Decomposition of Country and Industry Effects
The table shows the percentage of total variance in corporate governance ratings explained by country and
sector dummy variables using partial sum of squares analysis of variance.  The corporate governance ratings we use
come from CLSA, Fortune, Déminor, and Proxinvest.
In April 2001, CLSA released a large study of corporate governance entitled, “Saints & Sinners:  Who’s
got religion,” which reviewed corporate governance at the firm level in 25 emerging markets.  A firm’s corporate
governance score is based on responses to 57 yes/no questions about various aspects of governance.  The CLSA
questionnaire is divided into seven sections covering fiscal discipline, accounting transparency/disclosure, board
independence, board accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment of shareholders, and social awareness.  The
score for each of the seven sections is simply the percentage of questions receiving a “yes” answer in that section.
The overall corporate governance score for the firm is a weighted average of the firm’s scores in these seven
sections.
Fortune magazine publishes an annual list of global most admired companies.  To construct this list, firms
from the Global 500 list of largest companies are separated by sector and sectors dominated by firms from one
country are removed.  Every firm is sent a survey asking it to rate all of the other firms in its sector on a scale of 1 to
10 on eight characteristics:  quality of management, quality of products and services, innovativeness, long-term
investment value, financial soundness, ability to attract/develop/retail talent, community responsibility, and use of
corporate assets.  A firm’s “admired” score is simply the average of the scores over these eight characteristics. The
variable Sales/Max Sales is included the Fortune regressions to control for the portion of the admired score
attributable to being the largest firm in the sector.
Déminor, an independent consultancy firm in Brussels, has rated 250 of the 300 largest European firms on
over 70 governance indicators which are grouped into four governance categories:  rights and duties of shareholders,
absence of takeover defenses, disclosure, and board structure.  Since the board structure rating is not publicly
available, the table uses the average of the first three.
ProxInvest is a French proxy voting service which calculated corporate governance ratings for 250 top
European companies.  They publicly disclose ratings for only the top rated 100 of these companies.  ProxInvest









Country 37% 17% 57% 39%
Sector 6% 13% 2% 12%
Sales/Max Sales in Sector - 11% - -
Number of Countries 16 13 13 9
Number of Sectors 18 26 10 10
Number of Firms 470 294 250 8843
Appendix 7:  Description of Explanatory Variables at the Firm Level
The firm-level empirical analysis will use four indicators of capital market globalization as well as two
indicators of product market and labor market globalization:  institutional investor holdings, top U.S. or U.K.-based
shareholders, U.S. common stock or ADR listings, the use of global intermediaries, export intensity, and proportion
of foreign board members.
28  Here we discuss the motivation for each of the six indicators in greater detail and
explain how each indicator was obtained.
A.  Institutional Investors
Institutional investors are any entities, that invest in, or buy and sell, securities for their own account and
include banks, insurance companies, broker/dealers, pensions funds, and mutual funds, but not individuals who
manage their own accounts.  Starting in 1987 in the U.S., institutional investors, pension funds in particular,
deviated from their prior role as passive investors by submitting proxy proposals focusing largely on corporate
governance issues. As professional managers of capital, these investors have the requisite knowledge and experience
to differentiate between poorly governed and well-governed firms.  For example, the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS), with over $100 billion invested in equities, is frequently mentioned in the
shareholder activism literature.  CalPERS has set out corporate governance principles in the U.S. and other OECD
countries and has pressured poorly performing companies to reform their corporate governance practices.
29  The role
of shareholder activism in affecting governance and performance has been addressed by academics theoretically and
studied empirically with mixed results by a number of researchers, including Buxbuam [1991], Black [1992ab],
Pound [1993], Kissane [1997], Opler and Sokobin [1998], and Gillan and Starks [2000].
Bloomberg compiles data on the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional owners from three
sources:  mutual fund filings, 13-F filings, and schedule D filings.  Bloomberg receives annual or semi-annual
reports on holdings of mutual funds based in the U.S., the U.K. and a dozen other countries.  According to Section
13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act, any U.S. or foreign institutional investment manager that uses the U.S. mail or
other instrumentality of interstate commerce in the course of their business and exercises investment discretion over
$100 million or more in assets is required to report holdings on form 13-F.
30  Schedule Ds are financial statements
filed annually by insurance companies (including life and property and casualty companies).
A manual scan of the first Bloomberg screen listing up to seventeen holders for many of the firms in the
CLSA data revealed that the great majority of holders were U.S.-based mutual funds with U.K.-based mutual funds
in second place.  There were few instances of mutual funds based in other countries, and in many cases mutual funds
listed as foreign were actually U.S. funds.
31   There was an occasional holding by a U.S. pension fund or a U.S. or
UK bank; holdings by insurance companies were rare.
B.  Top Shareholders
Convergence in corporate governance may occur when shareholders based in countries with good corporate
governance standards impose good corporate governance on the companies they control.  On the other hand, if the
corporate governance of a foreign controlled firm in a developing country is in fact no different from governance of
domestic owned firms in that country, the foreign corporate governance standards must be inefficient for or
                                                
28 It is not always clear whether a particular variable proxies cleanly for one or another type of market integration.
Our objective is to ensure a broader focus than purely on capital market integration variables.
29 When the president of CalPERS visited Paris, the Paris daily paper published an article titled, “The Pension Funds
That Drive Fear into the French.” (as cited in Tagliabue [2000]).  For more information on CalPERS activities in
governance reform, see http://www.calpers-governance.org.
30 Institutional investors are only required to report on securities listed in the Official List of Section 13(f) Securities
published by the SEC which may exclude some non-US listed shares.  See “Frequenty Asked Questions about Form
13F,” SEC Division of Investment Management, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm
31 For example, the Templeton India Growth Fund is listed as an Indian mutual fund even though it is controlled by
the Franklin Templeton Group, a large California-based investment management company44
incompatible with the business environment of that developing country.  To make progress on this issue empirically,
we attempt to identify the origin of top shareholders of firms in developing countries.
32  Some firms list the names of
the banks serving as nominees as their shareholders, while others, most notably firms in China, are structured with
multiple levels of wholly owned holdings companies which must be traced to find the ultimate controlling interest.
Many firms, especially Indian firms, do not report their top shareholders in their annual reports at all.  By searching
Bloomberg and the internet for information on the top shareholder in each firm, we are able to identify the origin of
the top shareholder for 235 of the 482 firms in the CLSA sample. Although most firms in our CLSA sample are
locally owned, there are 13 firms where the top shareholder was a U.K. or U.S. firm.   We are currently repeating
this procedure for the Déminor data.
C.  U.S. listing
We track whether each company’s securities are traded in the U.S., either as American Depositary Receipts
(ADR) or underlying stock.  A common reason for listing in the U.S. is to expand the shareholder base by making it
easier for U.S. investors to buy shares.  Some U.S. investors, such as the majority of U.S. pension funds, can only
invest in U.S. dollar denominated shares while others prefer to purchase foreign shares on a U.S. exchange to
minimize transaction costs.  The business press has cited numerous examples of companies listing in the U.S. to find
additional capital to fund their growth.
33  The academic literature has also pointed to this motivation.
34  Although
U.S.-traded stock and ADRs are subject to reporting, disclosure, and corporate governance requirements mandated
by the U.S. Exchange Act and the listing rules of the exchanges, many of the requirements, with the exception of
conformance to U.S. GAAP, are frequently waived for foreign issuers.
35 Both compliance with listing requirements
and additional voluntary improvements are examples of capital market pressure – yet the sources of the pressure are
somewhat different: enforcement of SEC and exchange requirements or an appeal directly to investors.
36
In an empirical analysis of factors influencing the decision to list in foreign capital markets, Saudagaran
[1988], mentions, in addition to gaining access to a different investor base, two non-capital market reasons.  A
foreign listing might aid product visibility and provide “free advertising” for sales in that country.  This aspect is
often referred to as the “prestige” element of listing on a major exchange (See for example Baker and Edelman
[1991]).  A foreign listing can also improve the practicability of an employee stock ownership plan for employees in
the host country.  In this sense, a U.S. listing becomes a proxy for product market globalization and labor market
globalization in addition to capital market globalization.  We have also captured whether the firms have listed in
London as common stock or Global Depository Receipts (GDRs).
37
                                                
32 La Porta et al. [1999a] provide a description of ownership structures around the world and explains how to trace
these structures to the ultimate owner.  Our methodology is an approximation of the technique they use in that we
seek merely to trace ownership to the first entity that is not a holding company. Our approximation is reasonable on
the assumption that US or UK based shareholders will generally not try to control a developing country company
through pyramidal ownership structures that we do not pick up. If US or UK shareholders control a developing
country firm through a pyramid in the US or UK, we still treat the part of the pyramid that we observe as potentially
being the bearer of good governance practices.
33 See for example, Mark Fisher, “Can German firms resist a U.S. listing?”  Corporate Finance, April 1993, p. 23,
discussing the impact on other German firms of Daimler-Benz’s decision to list on the NYSE.  See also
“Stockmarket listings:  Plunging into foreign markets,” The Economist, September 17, 1994, p. 86.  For a less
optimistic account of the value of a U.S. listing, see Charles Olivier, “Are dual listings a waste of time?”, Euroweek,
October 1997, 29-31.
34 Merton[1987], for example, has developed a model where investors only invest in firms they are aware of and
listing aids investor recognition.  See also Foerster and Karolyi[19xx] on the use of ADRs.
35 An excellent source of detailed information on legal requirements of foreign listings is Greene et al. [2000].  For
NYSE requirements in particular, see NYSE Listed Company Manual, available online at www.nyse.com.
36 Siegel (2001) documents cases of expropriation in Mexican companies with ADRs and argues that US listings
provide insufficient deterrence against such practices.
37 In an earlier version of this paper, we used as an independent variable whether the firm listed in the U.K. or the
U.S. but this does not change the results.45
D. Capital Market Intermediaries
According to Hansmann and Kraakman [2001], the use of global rather than local intermediaries (such as
big five accounting firms, top investment banks, and consulting firms) will facilitate convergence in corporate
governance. For each firm in our sample, we collect data on the name of the auditor as reported in Bloomberg.  In
some developing countries, big five accounting firms have licensed their names to local firms.  These local firms
sign the auditor’s statement but the official auditor as reported for company databases is the big five firm.  Since
some firms report a local auditor to Bloomberg, we might still obtain an effect although the coefficient would be
biased downwards.  Bloomberg also reports on recent offerings for some companies based on information provided
by the lead manager of the investment bank handling the offering.  We code two binary variables for the regression
analysis:  whether the firm has a big five auditor and whether it recently placed an offering through a global
investment bank.
E.  Export Intensity
Our proxy for a firm’s exposure to global product market competition is its export to sales ratio.  We
assume firms that do not report geographic segmentation data in their annual report have no exports, although that is
not necessarily the case.  Since the lack of disclosure of geographic segmentation can be correlated with poor
governance, assuming non-disclosing firms have zero exports can bias the coefficient upwards.
F.  Foreign management and directors
Although we do not know the percentage of all employees that are foreign, we can estimate this figure for
senior management and directors, as it is this class of employees which should have the strongest relationship with
corporate governance.  A sampling of the management and board of directors was taken using the first page of the
Bloomberg management screen which lists up to eighteen executives or directors.  These names were manually
scanned for instances of foreign first and last names.  Although the list was scanned for any person whose name was
clearly not from the region in which the firm is located, almost all of the foreign persons found were American.
Firms in South Africa and the Philippines were not included in this sample because of the difficulty of
distinguishing foreign names for these countries.46
Appendix 8:  Firm-Level Regression Analysis
The table explores the effects of various types of global integration on a firm’s governance score for firms in 24 emerging markets. The dependent variable is an
overall governance score computed by averaging each firm’s scores, as computed by CLSA, along seven dimensions of governance:  fiscal discipline, accounting
transparency/disclosure, board independence, board accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment of shareholders, and social awareness.  In some cases not
all seven dimensions are used because one of the dimensions is based in part on an explanatory variable.  For example, one of the 10 questions in the fairness
section is whether foreign portfolio managers own more than 20% of the stock; this question is related to the institutional ownership independent variable.
Standard Errors shown in Parentheses.  * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level
Panel A:  Firm-level regressions on CLSA ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)














































































Holdings of  largest shareholder
(fraction of outstanding shares)
 0.79
(3.75)
Number of Country dummy vars. (not
including constant)
18 15 18 17 16
Number of Sector dummy vars.
(not including constant)



















R-squared 0.0294 0.443 0.5326 0.0560 0.4696 0.641 0.4526 0.4648
Ad j R-squared 0.0222 0.3847 0.4574 0.0515 0.4184 0.0587 0.3908 0.3961
Observations 407 402 275 426 421 351 346 33547
The table explores the effects of various types of global integration on a firm’s governance score for firms in 13
Western European countries.  The dependent variable is an overall governance score based on data from Déminor,
an independent consultancy firm in Brussels which rated 250 of the 300 largest European firms on over 70
governance indicators.  The overall governance score is computed as the average of the firm’s scores in three areas
of governance:  rights and duties of shareholders, absence of takeover defenses, and disclosure.  Standard errors
shown in Parentheses.  * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level
Panel B:  Firm-level regressions on Déminor Ratings





































Number of Country dummy vars. (not
including constant)










R-squared 0.1065 0.6018 0.5881 0.5980
Ad j R-squared 0.0990 0.5773 0.5654 0.5687
Observations 242 242 250 23648
Panel C:  Firm-level variables used—Summary Statistics
CLSA variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corporate Gov. Average 482 56.52 13.22 14.84 93.80
Discipline 482 49.82 19.68 0.00 100.00
Transparency 482 57.43 20.62 0.00 100.00
Independence 482 56.75 27.69 0.00 100.00
Accountability 482 48.29 22.65 0.00 100.00
Responsivenss 482 51.57 22.61 0.00 100.00




Social Awareness 482 68.51 22.11 0.00 100.00
Trades in US 482 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Trades NYSE 482 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Institutional Ownership 451 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.34
Auditor is big 5 450 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00
Capital Market
Major U.S. bank offering 482 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Product Market Exports/Sales 482 0.06 0.19 0.00 1.00
Foreign first name 353 0.22 0.27 0.00 1.00 Labor Market
Foreign last name 353 0.07 0.16 0.00 1.00
Log assets 426 7.44 1.67 2.85 13.31 Controls
Largest shareholder 315 0.41 0.20 0.01 0.96
Panel B:  Déminor variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corporate Gov. Average 252 2.86 1.04 1.00 4.67
Shareholder Rights 259 3.01 1.14 1.00 4.00




CG Disclosure 255 3.13 1.47 1.00 5.00
Trades in US 262 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Trades NYSE 262 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Institutional Ownership 253 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.21
Auditor is big 5 248 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Capital Market
Major U.S. bank offering
Product Market Exports/Sales 262 0.33 0.34 0.00 0.99
Log assets Controls
Largest shareholder 157 0.25 0.20 0.01 0.7249
Appendix 9:  CLSA firms where top shareholder is UK or US based
The table tests the hypothesis that firms with major foreign shareholders have better governance, as measured by the
CLSA overall governance score.  By searching Bloomberg and the internet for information on the top shareholder in
each firm, we are able to identify the origin of the top shareholder for 235 of the 482 firms in the CLSA sample.
Although most firms in our CLSA sample are locally owned, there are 13 firms where the top shareholder was a
U.K. or U.S. firm.   Each row shows the corporate governance score for firms with a large foreign owner as well as
the average score for all firms in the country.  Although in most cases, the firm’s governance score exceeds the
country average, a regression with fixed industry effects and control variables for firm size found this difference to
not be statistically significant.
Firm Name Country Sector Owner WCG Cntry
WCG
Cathay Pacific Hong Kong Airlines 45% owned by Swire Group, a
family owned firm which invests in
Asia (UK)
76 62.8
Wing Hang Hong Kong Banks 25% owned by Bank of New York
(US)
68.1 62.8
Kookmin Bank South Korea Banks 11% ownership by an investment
group of Goldman Sachs (US)
49.4 47.7
Swire Hong Kong Conglomerates Top Shareholder is Swire Group, a





Malaysia Consumer 50% owned by British American
Tobacco (UK)
77.8 56.7
Giordano Hong Kong Consumer 26% combined ownership by Tiger
Management and Harris Associates
(US)
73.9 62.8
Modelo Mexico Consumer 35% owned by Anheuser-Busch
(US)
71.8 64.4
Guinness Malaysia Consumer 51% owned by GAPL, which in
turn is partly owned by Guiness
(UK)
60.4 56.7
AngloGold South Africa Metals &
Mining





South Africa Metals &
Mining
24% owned by Anglo American
(UK)
65.2 69.3
Anglo American South Africa Metals &
Mining
??? 64.6 69.3
Marco Polo Singapore Property 57% owned by HSBC (UK) 50.8 64.5
Datacraft Singapore Technology 50% owned by Dimensation Data
(UK)
67.7 64.5